Institutions as constraints and resources: explaining cross-national divergence in performance management by Doellgast, Virginia & Marsden, David
  
Virginia Doellgast, David Marsden 
Institutions as constraints and resources: 
explaining cross-national divergence in 
performance management 
 
Article (Published version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
Original citation: 
Doellgast, Virginia and Marsden, David (2018) Institutions as constraints and resources: 
explaining cross-national divergence in performance management. Human Resource 
Management Journal. ISSN 0954-5395 
 
DOI: 10.1111/1748-8583.12214 
 
Reuse of this item is permitted through licensing under the Creative Commons: 
 
© 2018 The Authors 
CC BY 4.0 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/89978/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: October 2018 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. You may freely distribute the URL 
(http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website.  
 
 
 
Received: 22 December 2017 Revised: 10 August 2018 Accepted: 14 August 2018
DOI: 10.1111/1748-8583.12214OR I G I N A L A R T I C L EInstitutions as constraints and resources:
Explaining cross‐national divergence in
performance management
Virginia Doellgast1 | David Marsden21Cornell University, ILR School, Ithaca, New
York, USA
2Department of Management, London School
of Economics, London, UK
Correspondence
Professor Virginia Doellgast, Cornell
University, ILR School, 364 Ives Faculty Hall,
Ithaca, NY 14853, USA.
Email: vld7@cornell.edu
Funding information
Economic and Social Research Council, Grant/
Award Number: RES‐061‐25‐0444- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
This is an open access article under the terms of
reproduction in any medium, provided the original
© 2018 The Authors Human Resource Manageme
Hum Resour Manag J. 2018;1–18.Abstract
This article compares performance management practices in
call centres from four telecommunications firms in the
United Kingdom, France, Denmark, and Germany. Findings
show that different combinations of institutional con-
straints, such as strong job security protections, and partic-
ipation resources supporting worker voice were influential
in shaping choices among policies to motivate and discipline
workers. Performance management most closely
approached a high‐involvement model where both con-
straints and resources were high, where worker representa-
tives were able both to restrict management's use of
sanctions and to establish procedures that improved the
perceived fairness of incentives. Findings contribute to
debates concerning the role of contextual factors in the
design and effectiveness of HRM.
KEYWORDS
call centres, comparative HRM, performance management,
telecommunications1 | INTRODUCTION
A large body of comparative research has shown that institutions at national and workplace levels can influence firms'
human resource (HR) practices (Doucouliagos, Freeeman, & Laroche, 2017; Katz & Darbishire, 2000; Marsden, 1999;
Maurice, Sellier, & Silvestre, 1986). Researchers disagree, however, on the mechanisms through which they produce
or shape these practices. One argument holds that institutions supporting workplace participation, when combined- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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2 DOELLGAST AND MARSDENwith coordinated vocational training and collective bargaining, can provide critical resources for management to
adopt high‐involvement models relying on worker skills and discretion (Gittell & Bamber, 2010; Hall & Soskice,
2001). Other scholars focus on how institutions such as labour laws and encompassing collective agreements
constrain management choices, discouraging firms from adopting low road HR practices relying on low wages and
job insecurity (Bosch, Mayhew, & Gautié, 2010; Sherer & Leblebici, 2001).
In this article, we develop a framework for analysing the impact that different combinations of institutional
resources and constraints have on the practices firms use to motivate and compensate their workforce, which we
broadly place under the rubric of performance management. We apply this framework to explain variation in models
of performance management adopted in similar call centres, based on a matched comparison of incumbent telecom-
munications firms in Denmark, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
We identify two distinct mechanisms through which labour market and collective bargaining institutions shape
performance management. The first is via institutional constraints such as job security protections or contract provi-
sions that restrict the use of certain sanction‐based practices. The second is via participation resources that labour
can use to establish procedures that improve the transparency, design, and perceived fairness of performance manage-
ment. Although each mechanism can help to improve worker control and security, we argue that the overall approach
to performance management will most closely approach a high‐involvement model delivering mutual gains when both
are present. The German case of DeutscheTelekom demonstrated the most favourable outcomes in this regard due to
its strong job security protections, legal participation rights, and partnership structures at multiple levels of the firm.We
argue that this configuration of institutions can make it easier for management to make credible commitments to
workers that they will act in good faith when the latter accept more flexible patterns of performance management.
In the following sections, we first set out a framework for considering the influence of labour market and collec-
tive bargaining institutions on performance management. We then present a summary and analysis of the case study
results. The paper concludes with a discussion of the contribution of our findings to current debates in the strategic
and comparative HR literatures.2 | CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Performance management is a central component of HRM or employment systems, consisting of the practices and
policies an organisation uses to motivate and discipline its employees. These include goal setting, performance mon-
itoring and feedback practices, coaching, sanctions, and rewards, such as variable pay and upgrading via promotions.
The performance management system that an organisation adopts reflects a series of choices concerning how to
respond to problems of incomplete contracts (Commons, 1924; Gibbons & Henderson, 2012; Stinchcombe, 1986),
imperfect information (Simon, 1976), and the high costs associated with market sanctions, especially for the weaker
party (Crozier, 1963). We view these organisational responses as differing along two dimensions.
The first dimension concerns the direct consequences and rewards attached to performance outcomes. Broadly
speaking, organisations can adopt “incentive‐based” models that reward performance through better pay, promotion,
and investment in skills. Alternatively, they can adopt more narrowly “sanction‐based” practices that rely on the threat
of employer exit from the employment relationship via dismissal. Although these are not mutually exclusive (organisa-
tions can combine incentives and sanctions), they are underpinned by differentmechanisms for encouraging adherence
to specified standards, with incentives requiring more adaptability of the employment contract compared to sanctions.
The second dimension concerns the method of coordination, which we view as the response to the uncertainty or
indeterminacy inherent in the employment relationship. Here, we follow Mintzberg (1979) in distinguishing between
coordination by “standardisation” and coordination by “mutual adjustment.” In the area of performance management,
the former would involve an emphasis on centralised mechanisms for evaluating performance, including detailed perfor-
mance standards and intensive monitoring. Mutual adjustment, in contrast, relies on adaptable performance standards
that are governed with input from the workforce as new information arises, and thus trades control for greater flexibility.
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native “models” of performance management. Our central concern is to analyse how labour market and collective
bargaining institutions shape choices among these models. We focus here on formal institutions established through
law and collective bargaining, including employment protections, works councils and their participation or co‐deter-
mination rights, and union agreements and their provisions. We argue that these institutions affect performance
management in two ways.
First, institutions establish legal or negotiated constraints on the consequences that management is able to attach
to performance outcomes—thus potentially limiting access to sanction‐based practices and encouraging incentive‐
based ones. These could include, for example, strong job security rights, based on national legislation or collective
agreements, which limit management's ability to dismiss workers on the basis of poor performance. They also may
include negotiated or legal restrictions on certain monitoring practices. According to power resources theory, these
constraints will be strengthened where unions and workers enjoy countervailing power to limit managerial discretion
via stronger organisational capacity (Pulignano, Doerflinger, & De Franceschi, 2016), labour market power (Fligstein &
Byrkjeflot, 1996), and/or participation rights (Doellgast & Berg, 2018). They are often influenced by strong employ-
ment protection legislation (EPL), such as provisions placing strict limits on valid reasons for dismissal (OECD, 2004).
These negotiated and legal constraints make it more difficult to use the threat of dismissal or intensive monitoring
practices to motivate workers. This may encourage management to adopt alternative policies based on incentives,
and allow them to make more credible commitments to reciprocate cooperation from their employees. For example,
Marsden and Belfield (2010) found that French and British firms facing stronger dismissal restrictions were more
likely to use incentive pay.
Second, institutions provide different resources for management and worker representatives to draw on in devel-
oping and overseeing flexible adjustments to performance standards—thus potentially encouraging coordination by
mutual adjustment rather than by standardisation. One critical set of resources is based on collective worker voice
via participatory bodies at the workplace and organisational levels, such as works councils or consultative commit-
tees. Where worker representatives are integrated into strong and influential joint consultation and decision‐making
bodies, we would expect workers to play a more central role in overseeing the implementation of practices and
adjusting them based on changing circumstances. Past research in call centres has shown that strong participation
rights can serve as a crucial resource for workers in preventing arbitrary performance monitoring and ensuring per-
ceived fairness of incentives (Doellgast, 2012). Employers also have been found to benefit from stronger worker
cooperation, associated with strongly institutionalised worker voice, in improving practices and processes (Ornston
& Schulze‐Cleven, 2015) and in identifying problems and best practices (Doucouliagos et al., 2017). Where collective
voice is weak to moderate, managers have less incentive as well as fewer possibilities to integrate worker represen-
tatives into decision making, pushing them towards coordination by standardisation.
We have chosen to focus on formal labour market and collective bargaining institutions. However, we acknowl-
edge that institutional resources may also be derived from training institutions that encourage investment in polyva-
lent skills (Hall & Soskice, 2001). We may further expect more polyvalent skills to complement high internal flexibility
in work design (Sorge & Streeck, 1988); which in turn may make it more difficult to design precise performance stan-
dards. At the same time, recent research suggests that training institutions have declining or increasingly heteroge-
neous effects within countries—particularly the service sector settings we are studying here (Lloyd & Payne, 2016).
It is also difficult to disentangle the effects of training institutions from job security arrangements, which encourage
higher tenure and thus a more experienced workforce (Benassi, 2016). For these reasons, we treat skill‐based differ-
ences as a potential alternative explanation to be examined, rather than as a central component of our model.
We develop a framework below that specifies the alternative performance management models that we expect
to develop where management and labour face different combinations of institutional constraints and resources (see
Figure 1). We assume for purposes of this framework that technology and competitive market segment leave
management with a degree of freedom as to as to how far they standardise and rationalise work. This covers much
service work, including many professional or semi‐professional jobs, as well as manufacturing. In addition, as we are
FIGURE 1 Framework for analysing effects of institutional resources and constraints on performance management
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collective voice and legal and negotiated constraints.
Moderate legal and negotiated constraints on their own—absent strong collective voice mechanisms—are blunt
instruments for influencing the content of performance management. They are also ill‐equipped to deal with the
problem of contract breach when it is ambiguous. Thus, in Quadrant I of Figure 1, where both constraints and
resources are moderate, we would expect a performance management model that most closely approximates mana-
gerial control, with sanction‐based practices and coordination by standardisation. This can be seen as reflecting a
combination of technical and bureaucratic forms of control—with standardisation of performance measurement
and monitoring practices justified according to technical criteria, and enforced via progressive discipline and sanctions
tied to administrative rules and procedures (Callaghan & Thompson, 2001; Edwards, 1979).
In Quadrant II, we expect moderate collective voice resources similarly to encourage a model of performance
management that is characterised by rigid, bureaucratic rules—with high levels of standardisation in performance
standards and measurement tools. However, limits on sanction‐based practices may also encourage alternative forms
of incentives, including performance evaluation, job ladders, and professional development. We term this a bureau-
cratic high commitment model of performance management. In a sense, management is forced to adopt incentive‐
based practices that encourage discretionary employee commitment to the organisation's or work group's goals—thus
consistent with the notion of a shift from “control‐” to “commitment‐based” practices (Walton, 1985). However,
these are not significantly co‐designed with employees, and so more likely to be embedded in bureaucratic adminis-
trative rules that are uniformly applied.
There is a long tradition in the sociology of work explaining how management's rules can become bureaucratised
as a result of pressures from employees who seek to use them as protection against arbitrary management action in
the absence of more democratic channels of influence (Brown, 1973; Crozier, 1963). We expect performance man-
agement practices to be more flexible and adaptable where there is stronger institutional support for worker voice. At
the same time, past research has shown that an important condition for effective exercise of voice is the ability to
constrain exit via job security arrangements (Doucouliagos et al., 2017; Freeman & Medoff, 1984). This suggests that
protection from sanctions will also shape the form that this flexibility takes.
Under conditions of strong institutional resources for voice but moderate constraints on dismissal (Quadrant III), we
would expect stronger coordination with worker representatives to improve the transparency and fairness of perfor-
mance management practices. However, this will not necessarily result in significant devolution of control, particularly
where management is able to discipline workers through dismissal threats (Doellgast, Sarmiento‐Mirwaldt, & Benassi,
2016). We term this mixed approach a co‐managed concertivemodel. “Co‐management” has been used to describe works
councils that cooperate intensively with management on issues where there is a perceived common interest (Kotthoff,
1981), but that avoid overt conflict on zero sum distributional matters, often due to fears of layoffs or disinvestment
(Greer & Hauptmeier, 2008). Tompkins and Cheney (1985) define “concertive control” as control achieved via negotiated
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wherebymanagement derives flexibility benefits from some degree of negotiated consensus over performance standards,
while also retaining its ability to limit the scope of employee control through sanctioning noncompliance.
In Quadrant IV, management is constrained from adopting sanction‐based practices, and labour is able to partic-
ipate substantively in shaping an alternative approach to performance management. We argue that where these con-
ditions apply, performance management is most likely to approach a high‐involvementmodel, relying on a combination
of coordination by mutual adjustment and incentive‐based performance management (Guthrie, 2001). This builds on
Sorge and Streeck's (1988) notion of “beneficial constraints,” which they argued underlay the success of the German
production model. However, we place more emphasis on the importance of worker voice and countervailing power in
establishing procedures broadly viewed as legitimate by both management and workers.
In the remainder of the article, we demonstrate the value of this framework in explaining variation in the perfor-
mance management practices adopted by four different incumbent telecommunications firms in their call centres.3 | AN OVERVIEW OF THE CASE STUDY ORGANISATIONS
Call centre employment has become increasingly standardised. The development of an internationally networked call
centre subcontractor industry and diffusion of common technologies for call routing, work flow planning, and sched-
uling mean that work organisation can be easily centralised. Technologies for monitoring employee effort and perfor-
mance permit managers to benchmark call times, sales, and service quality and even to track key strokes. Although
employees do acquire firm‐specific skills, many are generic and transferrable. A number of studies have linked these
factors to intensifying performance management, narrowed worker discretion, and declining job quality (e.g., Bain &
Taylor, 2000; Russell, 2009; Sewell, Barker, & Nyberg, 2012). At the same time, comparative studies have found large
cross‐national differences in call centre management practices—suggesting that institutions can have a significant
impact on HRM (Batt, Holman, & Holtgrewe, 2009; Lloyd, Weinkopf, & Batt, 2010).
For this study, we carried out matched pair case studies in incumbent telecommunications firms, including TDC
(Denmark), DeutscheTelekom—DT (Germany), FranceTélécom/Orange—FT (France), and BT (UK). All four companies
experienced the liberalisation of their respective national telecommunications markets in the early‐1990s (BT) to late‐
1990s (TDC, DT, and FT). They also share a history of state ownership, with governments selling all shares in the
cases of BT and TDC and retaining close to 30% of shares in DT and FT. These changes in markets and ownership
placed pressures on the case study firms to restructure call centre jobs, with similar goals of improving efficiency,
productivity, sales, and service quality.
In all four firms, the majority of call centre employees were located within one or two large business units or sub-
sidiaries: BT's “BT Retail” line of business; FT's two closely coordinated fixed (AVSC) and mobile (CCOR) divisions;
TDC's “Consumer” business unit and “Call Center Europe” subsidiary; and DT's service subsidiary (DTKS). All compa-
nies had well‐developed collective agreements or negotiating relationships with labour unions: the CWU and Pros-
pect at BT; CGT, SUD, CFDT, FO, and CFE‐CGC at FT; Dansk Metal at TDC; and ver.di at DT. FT and TDC also
applied sectoral agreements, but they had limited impact on local practice, as both had more favourable company‐
level agreements. At all four companies, there had been substantial bargaining decentralisation, with many of the per-
formance management practices we focus on here governed primarily by business unit or local agreements. Job secu-
rity provisions were a major exception, as they tended to be company‐wide and influenced by national legislation.
Union density was high relative to national levels at all four companies, but did vary: around 90% at BT; 70% at
TDC; 60% at DT; and (roughly estimated) 20% at FT.
In each case study, interviews were conducted with management and worker representatives, and one site visit
was carried out at a large call centre workplace in each company, involving interviews with local management, worker
representatives, and supervisors. In total, we conducted 109 interviews (22 in Denmark, 37 in France, and 25 each in
Germany and the United Kingdom). Of these, 47 were with managers or supervisors, 35 with union representatives,
6 DOELLGAST AND MARSDENand 27 with local worker representatives such as works councillors or local shop stewards. We compared call centres
serving the “consumer” market segment in each case, which were primarily responsible for customer service, sales,
and technical support. We thus broadly control for the effects of technology, task, product market, and customer seg-
ment. Interviews focused on the recent evolution of work organisation and skills, performance management, and
working time or scheduling arrangements. Interviews were transcribed and coded in atlas.ti based on prior and emer-
gent themes, and detailed reports were written summarising each company case study. A series of comparative
reports that summarised the findings were distributed to interviewees and stakeholders at each company, and a con-
ference was held to discuss findings with these stakeholders. This allowed their corrections and feedback to be inte-
grated into the final report and our subsequent analyses.4 | INSTITUTIONAL RESOURCES AND CONSTRAINTS
Table 1 summarises the key institutional factors affecting outcomes in each case study.
First, FT and DT are cases characterised by strong institutional constraints, which we would expect to restrict
sanction‐based practices. They both had strong employment protections, through the combination of EPL, collective
agreements, and remaining civil servants, which made it difficult to act unilaterally to downsize employment or sanc-
tion workers. DT had additional constraints through works councils' strong co‐determination rights, allowing them to
limit monitoring and influence the criteria for sanctions and dismissals. Institutional constraints were more moderate
at BT and TDC, which are in countries with weaker employment protections and which faced fewer legal or negoti-
ated provisions supporting union influence over the use of performance criteria for dismissing workers.
Second, DT and TDC are cases characterised by strong institutional resources that support collective worker
voice. In both companies, works councils and unions worked closely together to coordinate bargaining and consulta-
tion with each other and at different levels of the companies. They had traditions of labour‐management cooperation
combined with high union density and strong, democratic worker involvement in the design of management prac-
tices. Institutional resources supporting collective voice were more moderate at BT and FT, due to the weak formal
participation rights of worker representatives. At BT, unions were cooperative and union density was high, but they
lacked institutionalised structures for worker participation in decision making at the local level. At FT, although there
were many forums for workplace consultation, these were weakened by the presence of multiple, divided unions; low
union density; and a history of conflictual labour relations.TABLE 1 Background on the case studies (2010–2012)
BT FT TDC DT
Job security
provisions
Moderate EPL,
moderate job
security in
collective
agreements
Strong EPL and job
security in collective
agreements; high
proportion of civil
servants with very
strong protections
(70%).
Weak EPL and negotiated
employment protections;
moderately stronger
protections for former
civil servants (35%)
Strong EPL and job
security in collective
agreements; some civil
servants with very
strong protections (35%);
Codetermination rights
over dismissal decisions.
Institutional
constraints
Moderate Strong Moderate Strong
Workplace
representation
bodies and
roles
Shop stewards represent
employees through
contract enforcement
(via grievances);
bargaining rights
limited. Single channel.
Works councils have
consultation rights;
but weak influence
of joint committees
on practices. Dual‐
channel.
Works councils have
consultation rights.
Strong tradition of
partnership on joint
committees, with shop
steward oversight.
Single‐channel.
Works councils have
strong consultation and
co‐determination rights
with veto across a
range of management
areas. Dual‐channel.
Institutional
resources
Moderate Moderate Strong Strong(est)
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tems, which may support higher and more polyvalent skills. However, we did not find systematic differences in train-
ing, skill levels, or work complexity. Initial training was roughly similar (4–6 weeks), and there was high tenure (15–
20 years) among the core workforce in all cases. TDC and BT had somewhat lower average tenure compared with
DT and FT, which we would expect based on their weaker job security arrangements. At the time of our research,
however, TDC and BT also had the most multiskilled work design, with mixed teams responsible for a range of call
types. At DT, work had been redesigned from a multiskilled team structure to more narrow specialisations across
seven segments, with different teams of generalists and specialists. FT's employees were also more specialised,
organised in two “levels,” with multiple specialisations within each and distinct “flows” for collections, sales, and ser-
vice. However, management was experimenting with multiskilled teams in some areas. Taken together, this suggests
that differences in training systems and skills are not a central explanation for the different models of performance
management we observed at the four case studies.
In the following sections, we examine how the constraints and resources that are the focus of our analysis
shaped performance management practices, based on the actors' perceptions of the strategies open to them and
the decisions made on the basis of those perceptions. We first compare the use of monitoring, coaching, and dis-
missals and then the use of variable pay, competitions, and promotions.4.1 | Performance monitoring, coaching, and dismissals
BT and TDC were both cases characterised by sanction‐based practices, with intensive performance monitoring
linked to progressive discipline, based on incremental stages of severity. In contrast, both FT and DT put stronger
emphasis on developmental coaching, in the face of legal and negotiated limits on dismissals.
4.1.1 | BT
Prior to the early 2000s, there were few consequences associated with poor performance at BT. A new performance
management model was implemented in 2003, which required benchmarking employees on a bell curve. Starting
around 2008, the unions accused the company of grading people down, even though they were not objectively poor
performers, simply to encourage them to take redundancy. This led to an explosion in grievance cases. In response,
BT negotiated an agreement with both CWU and Prospect in 2010, stipulating that the company would clearly state
its expectations, that the employees would perform accordingly, and that there would be no changes after a perfor-
mance review. The unions encouraged their members to insist that targets were “specific, measurable, achievable,
time determinate” (SMART). One union criticism was that, as part of the agreement, some appraisal categories were
redefined (from “generally satisfactory” to “development needed”) even though the company had claimed that this
would not be done.
According to one union official, this led to a “new” policy that lasted 6 months, after which BT returned to the
“bell curve”‐driven approach to performance management—even though this was not supposed to be used under
the agreement. The system was, again, challenged by the unions. Union representatives observed that central man-
agement blamed this aggressive approach on “rogue and misguided managers who are acting alone”—but they felt
that this was not true (Email communication, Prospect official, 15/02/2013). Managers also used so‐called compro-
mise agreements (car park deals) where somebody would be graded as having unacceptable performance and be
given 3 months' severance pay rather than being put through the 2‐year performance process, and were encouraged
to leave as an “unregretted leaver.”
The CWU negotiated an agreement with BT Retail that identified standards of best practice in performance man-
agement.1 However, these had limited impact on the practice of performance evaluation, with the union primarily
ensuring transparency and fairness via filing grievances and representing employees undergoing progressive discipline.
In BT call centres, operators' targets included sales, hourly calls, financial reporting, repeat calls, contact resolu-
tion, transfers, complaints, customer satisfaction, and call handling time. Some targets varied between different
8 DOELLGAST AND MARSDENsegments, and each had a weighting that changed monthly and factored into an overall performance indicator. A
traffic light system measured adherence to targets, as well as sign‐on, shrinkage, and sick days. Employees who
did not meet targets for 3 weeks would be placed on an informal coaching plan. If he or she did not improve, a per-
formance case was raised. In the call centre we visited, almost every agent had been on a performance plan at least
once. This whole process took about 10 weeks, but the agent could leave or appeal at every stage, with union
support.
The number of actual dismissals varied significantly across BT: They occurred about once a year in the centre we
visited, whereas at some centres, there could be multiple cases each month. The CWU shop stewards primarily
oversaw each case to make sure management was adhering to the process outlined in collective agreements, and
represented employees in grievances where they believed this process had been violated.
4.1.2 | TDC
Similar to BT, monitoring at TDC's call centres was intensive and constant, and employees could be dismissed if they
did not meet performance goals. At the same time, coaching appeared to be more flexible than at BT, with an overall
emphasis on training and development and fewer clear negotiated rules on the dismissal process that then needed to
be policed by shop stewards.
TDC employees were given a number of hard targets, including talk times, compliance with schedule, sales, and
customer service. A shop steward observed that there had been a shift in focus towards emphasising sales. However,
there had also been a growing focus on customer service, which had declined in the mid‐2000s and then become the
target of an initiative called TAC: “Take Aim to the Customer.” Increased focus on service in training, coaching, and
targets helped to reduce customer complaints from 13% to 7% (Interview, Labour Relations manager, 24/4/12).
At the same time, weak job security allowed management to use the threat of dismissal to encourage adherence
to targets. The result was a system combining coaching and team building with progressive discipline. For example,
managers had sought to reduce employee absenteeism rates, which were 10–12% in the mid‐2000s. They succeeded
in drastically reducing absenteeism to between 3.5% and 6% by 2012, through both education and having “a very
strict procedure of how many times can you be sick in a period, before [you are dismissed]” (Interview, TDC HR man-
ager HQs, 23/4/12). Team leaders observed that a lot of time and effort were put into managing these cases, to try to
decide on the right “decision” for each employee. However, the union only intervened in exceptional cases.
TDC managers had in some ways greater discretion over performance‐based dismissals compared with BT man-
agers, with a less transparent process of progressive discipline. At the same time, management action was policed by
union shop stewards, who were trusted to challenge dismissals they viewed as unfair or where employees had not
been given the opportunity to improve. This was less governed by clear rules and more by an ongoing process of
consultation and interest representation.
4.1.3 | FT
Similar to BT and TDC, there was also intensive monitoring in FT's call centres: Calls were recorded, and individual
performance was measured along a number of different metrics. In contrast to BT and TDC, however, FT placed
much less emphasis on progressive discipline, with no clear sanctions attached to poor performance. Local managers
explained this as due to both the high number of civil servants in the workforce, as well as restrictive employment
protection rules in France:France Télécom is an old public company with civil servants. So in general, people who are older than 38
are civil servants … in 80% of cases, so they have protected employment, and even if they make serious
mistakes or they are not at the right level, you can't do much. [… .] In France it is necessary to have
several warnings, a reprimand, etc. to be able to build a case for dismissal. But France Télécom doesn't
go into this area. Instead, we try with managers … with human resources … how to help them to
progress, to put them in a new position. (Interview, FT CC manager 2, 8/4/10)
DOELLGAST AND MARSDEN 9These limitations shaped the culture of coaching, training, and development. Each team leader listened to the team's
calls and carried out a debriefing to identify areas of improvement, while a trainer dedicated to several teams
organised individual training. The team leader met with the trainer regularly to develop a work plan for each customer
advisor:So, there is a tacit agreement between the team leader, the trainer, and the customer advisor, saying, in
this area, you are not at the expected level, so we are going to put in place help or a personalized
course, we'll put in place everything you can imagine, to be able to help you improve. (Interview, FT CC
manager 2, 8/4/10)One concern was reducing high levels of absenteeism, which could be between 6% and 10%. Local managers
described several strategies, including offering more flexible working time or encouraging “team spirit” “because
results are individually motivating but also motivating for the team” (Interview, FT CC manager 2, 8/4/10). It was
striking, in comparison with the BT case, that considerable effort was placed on developing a combination of intrinsic
or team‐based forms of motivation.
4.1.4 | DT
At DT, performance monitoring was more regulated than at the other three case study companies, due to strong
works council co‐determination rights in this area. The “works agreement” included negotiated limits on monitoring
frequency and data use, and individual employees were strongly protected from dismissal on the basis of perfor-
mance results. Similar to FT, these constraints on discipline encouraged management to emphasise developmental
coaching.
The works council had allowed more monitoring over time, as part of trade‐offs for stronger job security and
limits on outsourcing. Calls were recorded for the first time in the late 2000s, through an “Intelligent Routing &
Reporting Platform” (IRRP). Three times each week, team leaders would look at a sample of calls and recorded
“screenshots.” Team leaders could recognise employees' voices (names could not be recorded) and would go over
the calls with them and develop training plans.
One works councillor observed that “Many employees see this as a monitoring/control system: ‘The system sees
everything that I do.’” (Interview, DTKS works councillor, 21/6/12). Another observed that although team leaders
were supposed to use the tool for training purposes, they could abuse it to put additional pressure on individual
employees to meet increasingly strict targets (Interview, DTKS works councillor, 14/9/11).
A strong focus, as at FT, was on further training. Team leaders had conversations with employees about which
additional qualifications they needed and would sometimes discuss “whether they really think that this is the right
job for them.” The works council was trying to stop this practice, which was prohibited in the central works agree-
ment (Interview, DTKS works councillor, 21/6/12).
As at TDC, the works council played an active role in the methods used to reduce sickness absence. The absen-
teeism rate was 8–10% across DTKS, but in some areas, it was up to 40% (Interview, DTKS works councillor, 14/9/
11). DTKS responded to this by putting out baskets of fruit and giving special recognition to employees who had low
absenteeism. For long‐term sickness, the company agreement stipulated a thorough investigation, followed by an
invitation to a voluntary conversation with management. The agreement determined the exact process to follow,
who could participate, and the role of the works council. Dismissal was one possible outcome, but it was rare because
it had to be extremely well documented to withstand scrutiny from a labour court.4.2 | Incentives, variable pay, competitions, and promotions
The second area of performance management concerns the flexibility and coverage of performance incentives. These
are closely related to monitoring, coaching, and dismissals, in that their evaluations rely on information from monitor-
ing and they can substitute for or complement sanction‐based practices. BT and FT both limited variable pay to sales‐
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TDC and DT developed relatively sophisticated variable pay systems across job roles.4.2.1 | BT
At BT, variable incentives were limited to bonuses attached to meeting targets only for sales‐focused call centre jobs.
Management explained this as due to the CWU's long‐standing resistance to variable pay: Sales targets were viewed
as more objective and easier to measure and compare, and so were more acceptable from the union's perspective. If
sales employees hit 85% or more of their sales targets, they were eligible to receive a monthly bonus. If they hit over
105% they got an “Accelerator” for the quarter, which increased with higher sales. They were eligible for a “standard
commission on bonus” of 35% of “On‐target earnings.” If employees did not achieve 85%, they would receive the
additional coaching and feedback under a performance plan. If they did not improve, they would eventually be
dismissed. Across the company, all employees were eligible for certain competition‐based incentives: High
performers could enter a national competition for a prize and would get recognition from their manager through,
for example, a £25 voucher or a prize.
Outside of the sales area, the primary incentives were pay increases linked to formal performance evaluations.
Annual negotiations at group level established pay increases for pay bands, overtime rates, and London weighting.
In addition, the unions negotiated an overall pay raise, which would then be distributed based on performance.
New employees would usually join the pay scale at 80%, and after 4 years (if performance was satisfactory), they
would progress to the top of their scale. Then they would have quarterly and annual reviews, which would rank them
in four categories, from “underachieving” to “outstanding.” Employees' “grade” at the end of the financial year would
determine how much of that union‐negotiated pay raise they would receive. There was also an inflationary pay
review each January, which was negotiated with the CWU.
The performance evaluations were controversial, in that they could be subject to BT's “bell curve” style ranking
system (discussed above):If your performance is “not meeting targets,” it should be clearly advertised to you and you should get
performance plans to get you back on track where necessary. But because of the requirement for
quarterly levelling you often find that there are targets for a certain distribution of marks, though the
company absolutely denies this. A certain percentage needs to go to the bottom, the Jack Welch model.
(Interview, Prospect official, 06/07/2011)Thus, the challenges associated with a punitive system of performance management spilled over into the oper-
ation and adaptability of incentives—here, in the form of performance‐based raises. This system was already conflict‐
ridden, and so there was limited scope for unions to work cooperatively on developing a more transparent system of
performance‐based pay incentives.4.2.2 | FT
Similar to BT, variable performance‐based incentives at FT were limited to sales roles. Before the mid‐2000s, fixed
line and internet call centres had small incentives that were around 5% of salary (based on meeting individual goals),
whereas mobile call centres had individual variable pay that averaged 15–17% of salary; and group variable pay that
averaged 5% of salary.
By 2010, the system was standardised across these groups but limited to sales positions, which represented
around 40% of customer advisors. For this group, variable pay was linked to sales in relation to certain objectives
and multiplied by coefficients based on service quality and performance (e.g., number of calls handled per hour). In
order to get variable pay, it was necessary to reach at least 70% of the objectives in each of 10 product families.
However, if customer satisfaction was low, then sales would be multiplied by zero.
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with the system because it increased their pay. However, its level had fallen by close to 60% over 5 years. As at
BT, management also used small competitions across the workforce, which had no direct union involvement.
Again similar to BT, the major performance incentives across FT's call centre jobs were individual pay or
job grade progression linked to formal performance evaluations. Based on biannual reviews, team leaders and
department heads recommended high‐performing employees for discretionary increments or augmentations
managériales.The manager decides, based on the development of the sales employee or other employee, regardless
of the status of the person … his manager decides, based on his skills and performance, and the way
he conducts his work, if he deserves a large increase or no increase. (Interview, call centre trainer,
26/5/10)One union representative observed that in the past year, 70 employees in his region received these increments
in a workforce of 800–850 (8–9%; Interview, FT central works council rep CGT, 8/12/11).
From management's perspective, performance evaluations and promotions were important tools in the absence
of the ability to sanction poor performance:There aren't any sanctions, we have to try to make them improve as much as possible anyway. Of course,
we have annual meetings—and there we evaluate the level [of performance], that could be insufficient, that
could be an obstacle if someone wants to do another job or to get a promotion. So there are consequences
[for poor performance]. (Interview, FT call centre team manager, 8/4/10)However, from the union's perspective, these created systematic inequality and took pay out of union control:
“They all do the same work, but there are none who are paid the same” (Interview, FT call centre union rep,
19/5/10).
4.2.3 | TDC
Unlike BT and FT, TDC used variable pay for all employee groups: both sales and service. Call centre employees
received around 7–10% performance‐based pay, on top of base pay. The largest component for most groups was
individual‐based sales commission. However, the union had successfully argued for aggregating nonsales‐based
performance metrics at the team level, which was tied to a team‐based bonus:The sale is individual, but the other things we need to reach together. And that's one of the agreements,
because we know that they [management] want … they want the individual to be the most of it … all
of it. But we don't, so that's the agreement. (Interview, TDC call centre shop steward, 24/4/12)Management estimated that 60% of variable pay was based on individual performance and 40% on team perfor-
mance. Union representatives had also sought to improve the fairness and transparency of the sales commission
system through joint committees:We have meetings every month, where we discuss any changes to the parameters, and if they have we
discuss if they're fair. We have an agreement where everything about our bonus, how if changes come
along what do we do. [….] This agreement defines how this bonus should be managed. You cannot
make any changes that you just like, it should be a fair and meaningful change to the employee
and for the company here, and also to the customer. (Interview, Call Center Europe shop steward,
15/5/12)The same shop steward described one example in which the works council successfully argued for additional com-
pensation for employees who did coaching and training: “we agreed that they be compensated, and they were happy
and motivated.”
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DT went furthest by introducing a system of “pay at risk.” When the DTKS subsidiary was established in 2007, the
new collective agreement had introduced a pay system with 80% fixed salary and 20% dependent on meeting goals
in different areas. By 2012, in the general sales and customer service area, 67% of variable pay was based on a com-
bination of individual and team performance and 33% on DT or DTKS performance. Team goals were in five areas
with different weights, including customer satisfaction, call handling time, products, sales, and product bundling.
These goals were agreed at the team level: If two‐thirds of the team objected to goals, this would be brought to a
local joint committee that would review the objection. They could also contest the calculation of goals after the
second or fourth quarter. One works councillor observed that in his region, 70–75% of teams met their goals.
Company (DTKS or DT‐wide) goals were set by the joint advisory board, and employees got this portion of their
variable pay only if they were met.
However, employees in the more specialised “sales and customer retention” area had a greater proportion of pay
at risk, with 30% variable pay—with all or almost all of this based on individual performance. This created insecurity:
For example, a sales employee in the lowest pay group made €24,000/year—and €7,200 of this was be dependent on
meeting her goals. Some employees made only 30–50% of their goals, particularly if they were out sick for a period of time.
A key feature of the DT case is the deep involvement of the works council in the design and operation of per-
formance management. When the new system was introduced, the works council was initially able to get agreement
for protections to avoid major pay insecurity. This was accomplished largely through the joint committee and appeals
process. Meetings of the joint committee were held every quarter, and one works councillor noted that 52 appeals (at
the team level) were made to the committee in her region in one quarter, out of 300–350 teams (Interview, DTKS
works councillor, 28/9/10).
In 2012, the collective agreement dropped the former 70/30 base/variable pay split in the specialised sales area
in favour of 80% of the salary being secured for everyone: “We succeeded in getting agreement after several days of
strikes” (Interview, DTKS works councillor, 21/6/12). Workers in the lowest pay group got a 3% pay increase and
other pay groups a 2.3% pay increase.
After the 2012 agreement, the old model of setting and reviewing variable pay continued to operate in the sales
area, but the works council succeeded in modifying the system for nonsales employees. From 2013, this group would
be evaluated based on the “six most important goals” or the “Big Six.” This was in response to concerns that
employees were not able to influence all of the different goals they were given, and felt it was creating too much
stress. The new goals were overseen by and approved by the advisory board at the beginning and end of the year
(Interview, DTKS works councillor, 27/8/13).
Management had also long used team competitions with prizes—like a trip or an iPod, but the works council was
fighting with management for greater decentralisation:We have a central works agreement about that, that this [local competitions] should be exclusively a
subject of local co‐determination. [….] So there was a wide range of arguments, and in the end we as
the works council are coordinating these competitions, when they are running nation‐wide, and also give
a recommendation—so co‐determination is clearly taking place at the local level. (Interview, DTKS works
councillor, 21/6/12)DT is thus unique among our cases in having very high union and works council involvement in both the design and
implementation of a range of performance incentives, including these smaller competitions.5 | COMPARISON OF PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT MODELS
The case studies showed a similar trend towards increased centralisation and standardisation of performance man-
agement practices. Call centre employees were expected to meet multiple targets in call handling time, compliance
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ual‐ and team‐based metrics, remote monitoring, and side‐by‐side listening with coaches.
At the same time, each case adopted a distinctive set of practices to meet similar overall goals and with similar
technological tools. We argue that these differences were related to patterns of institutional constraints, primarily
through job security arrangements, and institutional resources, in the form of employees' capacity to influence the
design of alternative practices.
Based on the framework we developed in Section 2 (Figure 1), the four cases map onto the four quadrants asso-
ciated with different performance management models. BT most closely resembles a managerial control model,
characterised by a focus on both sanctions and coordination by standardisation. Collective agreements built some
predictability into coaching, feedback, and progressive discipline—ensuring that this was carried out in a standardised
way that gave employees opportunities to improve through intensive coaching. In addition, performance‐based
incentives were limited to sales roles, where performance was easily measured, and were aggregated at the team
level. However, these rules were relatively blunt instruments in influencing the actual design of the performance
management system, which had become more punitive over time. There was quite a lot of measurement and individ-
ual‐based control focused on performance. In addition, labour relations concerning implementation of these rules
were relatively conflictual, with performance management at the centre of this conflict. Significantly, BT showed
the highest level of conflict over incentives and variable pay with arguably the lowest actual union influence. Perfor-
mance evaluations were superficially linked to incentives, but also had a strong disciplinary focus—connected with
weak job security and the broader system of sanctions. Much of this conflict was focused around cases that went
into grievance where the unions could keep management to agreed rules.
FT's practices superficially were similar to those at BT. Performance incentives were also restricted to sales
roles, although they encompassed measures of service quality. There was a strong emphasis on performance eval-
uation and promotion to motivate improved performance. However, stronger job security at FT, connected with
national legislation and the large number of civil servants, meant these evaluations could not lead to dismissals. This
encouraged management to adopt what we describe as a bureaucratic high commitment model, characterised by a
stronger focus on incentives with coordination by standardisation. It was impossible for FT managers to use pro-
gressive discipline, which ruled out a competitive “bell curve” style of benchmarking performance. Instead, managers
adopted other practices to motivate employees—primarily through frequent coaching and development, as well as
performance evaluation and sales incentives. Unions had some influence on the practices adopted, but primarily
through opposing intensified monitoring or linking more control‐oriented forms of performance management to
employee stress.
Management at BT and FT could reach agreement on variable pay for sales staff because in this activity, there
are relatively objective criteria that are less dependent on management judgement. Such criteria are more easily
enforced by grievance handling. In sales, employees also have greater control over their earnings because they have
control over their effort (Schloss, 1898). Thus, where institutional resources are relatively weak, worker representa-
tives are more likely to support incentives based on objective performance measures that give some protection
against management bad faith.
TDC and DT both had stronger institutional support for ongoing employee involvement in management deci-
sion making compared with BT and FT—which encouraged coordination by mutual adjustment. However, they dif-
fered in their emphasis on sanctions or incentives. The performance management model at TDC represented a co‐
managed concertive approach, combining a focus on team building, team‐based competitions, intensive training and
coaching, and individual‐ and team‐based variable pay with progressive discipline and the threat of dismissal. There
were weak constraints, compared with FT: It was much easier to dismiss employees for poor performance. Com-
pared with BT and FT, variable pay was permitted for a wider range of metrics. One reason for this is that the union
also had stronger voice through local works councils that allowed union representatives to influence the design and
transparency of variable pay, as well as to ensure that the process for evaluating performance and implementing
sanctions was viewed as fair. This created a workplace environment in which the union facilitated or supported
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were negotiated and overseen via mutual adjustment. At the same time, the lack of the hard “constraint” of job
security also opened the possibility for sanction‐based practices. Interestingly, there was also less labour conflict
associated with this sanction‐based model compared with BT, which suggests that stronger worker voice supported
the perceived fairness and transparency of both incentives and the process of managing performance evaluation
and dismissals.
Finally, DT relied on a performance management model that most closely resembled the high‐involvement ideal,
with a focus on training and development and a heavy reliance on team‐based coaching and performance‐based pay.
These practices were contested and changed over time as the direct result of collective negotiations, with works
councils who had strong voice in their design and implementation. Similar toTDC, consultation with worker represen-
tatives could serve as resources for gaining agreement on potentially controversial measures. However, in contrast to
TDC, DT faced clear constraints on use of sanction‐based practices, due to both strong job security in collective
agreements and works agreements that limited how performance information was monitored and used. As a result,
DT adopted practices that achieved a balance between management demands for, for example, more tightly linking
pay with performance, and some degree of worker control over those practices. Works councils' power to introduce
and maintain negotiated constraints had declined over time, but they were seeking to rebuild that power through
creative compromises under more challenging conditions.6 | CONCLUSIONS
There are notable limitations to the generalizability of our research findings. The number of organisations is small,
they were formerly covered by public sector arrangements, and they have a similar legacy of employment practices
from past collective agreements. At the same time, our research design is distinctive in the close matching of nearly
identical workplaces based in similar organisations and market settings across different countries. Although we are
not able to control for all factors influencing the strategic choices of managers, our interviews suggest that the
factors we have identified played a significant role in shaping these choices.
Our findings and framework make two major contributions to the HRM and employment relations literature.
First, they answer the calls of recent reviews to broaden and deepen the empirical focus, theory, and methods used
in strategic HR research. One critique holds that HRM is increasingly dominated by psychological theory, leading to a
narrower focus on individual attitudes and behaviours (Godard, 2014; Harley, 2015; Kaufman, 2012). A related cri-
tique is that strategic HR research treats firms as closed systems, in which management choices are predominantly
rational and driven by alignment with business strategies (Marchington & Grugulis, 2000; Batt & Banerjee, 2012,
p. 1745–1746). Thus, for example, although we were able to find several recent HRM studies examining the influence
of contextual factors on performance management, these either focused on factors such as organisational culture and
employee relations climate (Haines III & St‐Onge, 2012) or broader organisational strategy within multinational firms
(Mellahi, Frynas, & Collings, 2016).
A central remedy proposed in these critical reviews is to integrate institutional context more systematically
into the study of HRM (Brewster, Mayrhofer, & Smale, 2016; Delbridge, Hauptmeier, & Sengupta, 2011). In this
paper, we place institutions at the centre of our analysis and demonstrate that they play a crucial role in encour-
aging sharply contrasting approaches to fostering motivation and commitment across nearly identical jobs in orga-
nisations competing in similar market segments. Our findings and framework imply that models seeking to specify
“best practice” or “best fit” HRM strategies are incomplete without accounting for the manner in which institu-
tional context constrains or enables different bundles of practices. Indeed, the high‐performance work systems
(HPWS) literature typically includes employee voice and job security arrangements in an HPWS “bundle” that also
includes flexible performance incentives of the kind we observed at DT (Laroche & Salesina, 2017). We demon-
strate that both voice and job security can be significantly strengthened or weakened by labour market and
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assumed in the HR literature.
Of course, the insight that institutions influence HRM is not a new one for employment relations researchers and
is a central theme in our own past research (Doellgast, 2012; Marsden, 1999). However, employment relations
scholars have faced challenges in reconciling empirical findings that demonstrate increasingly heterogeneous HR
practices within countries with the dominant macrofocused theories that posit coherent, nationally specific institu-
tional systems. Two particularly influential frameworks are the varieties of capitalism literature, which argues that
employers' strategies draw on institutions as resources for coordination (Hall & Soskice, 2001), and power resource
theories, which focus on how institutions establish constraints on employer discretion (Baccaro & Howell, 2017).
These models are useful as ideal types but do not generate clear predictions concerning the practices employers
adopt in real organisations subject to pressures and resources from changing institutions.
A second contribution of our study is thus to develop an original, integrative framework for theorising how dif-
ferent combinations of institutions affect management practice. We draw on past theories explaining organisations'
responses to broader systems of institutional resources and constraints, while also examining the underlying logic to
how those resources and constraints combine in different ways. Our framework builds on Mintzberg's (1979) distinc-
tion between coordination by standardisation and by mutual adjustment, as well as Simon's (1951) insights that the
employment relationship is based upon a deal whereby employees accept management's right to direct their labour
within a zone of acceptance. We identify four models for regulating the zone of acceptance and its performance
requirements: managerial control, bureaucratic high commitment, co‐managed concertive, and high involvement,
each underpinned by a different mix of institutional constraints and resources.
In contrast to the varieties of capitalism literature, our framework assumes that very similar business models or
strategic imperatives can be accomplished via these contrasting HR approaches. It also posits that institutional
mechanisms are not necessarily complementary to one another but rather configurational—in that they combine in
distinctive ways at the organisational level with different effects on practice and outcomes.
North (1990) proposes that we should consider institutions as the “rules of the game” that shape the strategies
that players can adopt in pursuit of their interests. In Stinchcombe's (1986) words, rules of exchange survive when
they ensure that both parties “get what they want.” They can facilitate cooperation by closing off “worst‐case scenar-
ios” (Scharpf, 1997). In our study, the “game” is managing relationships governed by a loosely defined zone of accep-
tance, and the worst‐case scenario is that its open‐ended nature will be exploited by the stronger party to press its
advantage at the weaker party's expense. As the costs of exit are usually more severe for the employee than the
employer, the protection by due process rules for dismissals, and their knock‐on effect attenuating related disciplin-
ary measures, helps to redress this imbalance so employees can feel more at ease with flexible performance criteria—
enabling the “game” of performance management to be played differently.
One general conclusion is that the interests of both parties in the employment relationship should be considered
simultaneously when analysing institutional effects on human resource management. To get the weaker party to buy
into more flexible patterns of working, the stronger one needs to be able to make credible commitments that it will
act in good faith. In this study, institutional rules governing employment protection and employee participation were
part of the context within which the firms operated. According to their strength, they provided the basis for such
commitments, enabling management to achieve more flexible models of performance management. Where these
institutions provide stronger guarantees that joint welfare will be pursued, we anticipate that the outcomes for
workers will also be improved.ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
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